عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]چکیده [English]
In this article, the behavior of GECF organization has been studied as a two-part cartel. Based on this, the supply side of world natural gas market considered as a monopolistic market in which GECF plays the role of the price maker firm. In the cartel, due to significant differences in the level of reserves of members, we face with a two-part cartel that each of the two parts in the c1artel tends to be leader. However, both know that they cannot be leader in the cartel simultaneously. Then they try to find an optimal solution about the production and pricing that resulted from cooperation and agreement.
This study uses annual data from 2010-1980, and optimized the cartel behavior until 2070. To obtain the supply of each of the two parts within the cartel Nash product was used. To solve the Nash product requires an initial point. In this study, unlike previous studies that have used the threat point, a new point has been used that we have called it encouragement point.
The results indicate that at first second group is responsible for the majority of extraction in the cartel and with approaching to check out the group reserves, the first group will became the dominant group in the cartel. Because the second group in compared with the first group has less reserves and higher discount rate, prefer that extract the reserves earlier than the first group. Thus in the first period the second group responds to the growing demand and then the first group increases the production and will become dominant on the supply side of the market.